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Abstract
This paper explores the extent of consumption smoothing between 1981 and 1985 in rural
Burkina Faso.  In particular, we examine the extent to which livestock, grain storage and
interhousehold transfers are used to smooth consumption against income risk.  The survey coincided
with a period of severe drought, so that the results provide direct evidence on the effectiveness of
these various insurance mechanisms when they are the most needed.  We find evidence of little
consumption smoothing.  In particular, there is almost no risk sharing, and households rely almost
exclusively on self-insurance in the form of adjustments to grain stocks to smooth out consumption.
The outcome, however is far from complete smoothing.  Hence the main risk-coping strategies,
which are hypothesized in the literature (risk sharing and buffer stock), were not effective during
the survey period.
Keywords: Livestock, consumption smoothing, permanent income hypothesis, precautionary
saving, risk sharing
JEL codes: D91, O16
21 Introduction
Rural households in developing countries face substantial risk. Households living in these risky
environments have developed a range of mechanisms to shield consumption from this risk, including
income smoothing, self-insurance, and social insurance arrangements. There has been a good deal
of work in recent years that examines the effectiveness of these formal and informal risk-sharing
and consumption-smoothing arrangements (e.g. Alderman and Paxson, 1994; Fafchamps and Lund,
2003; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; Townsend, 1994). The overall conclusion of this research is that
most households succeed in protecting their consumption from the full effects of the income shocks
to which they are subject, but not to the degree required by either a Pareto efficient allocation of
risk (within local communities) or by the permanent income hypothesis (over time).
We examine the consequences of severe income shocks generated by drought for food consump-
tion of a sample of farming households in rural Burkina Faso. We find evidence of very little
consumption smoothing. There are large fluctuations in aggregate consumption that closely track
the aggregate changes in income associated with the drought and subsequent recovery. There
is no evidence that livestock served as an effective buffer stock during this period, nor was there
significant use of financial markets to smooth these aggregate shocks. Village-level risk pooling
mechanisms were not effective. Conditional on aggregate shocks, we show that household con-
sumption closely tracks the substantial idiosyncratic shocks to household income. None of the
main risk-coping strategies that are hypothesized in the literature were effective during the crisis
period we examine.
In the context of the Sahel region of West Africa, primary among these hypothesized mechanisms
is the use of livestock as a buffer stock to insulate their consumption from fluctuations in income1.
Yet empirical studies have consistently found a small or insignificant response of livestock sales to
shocks in other income streams (Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas, 1998; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003;
Hoogeveen, 2002). This pattern of results suggests that net livestock sales may not compensate
for losses in income from other sources. In the specific context of Burkina Faso, Fafchamps, Udry,
and Czukas (1998) show that during some of the worst drought years in the recent history of the
1See for example Famine Early Warning System (1999) for how actual policy making is based on this assumption.
3region, livestock sales compensated for at most between 15 and 30 percent of income fluctuations.
Yet livestock holdings reported by most households at the end of the survey were large enough to
compensate entirely for their income fall2.
In this paper, we examine three possible explanations for the apparent inconsistency between
the commonly-shared belief that livestock is used as a buffer stock and the finding that there is
little response of livestock sales to income shocks. First, it is conceivable that households were able
to smooth consumption through other mechanisms, such as risk sharing or buffer stocks other than
livestock. Empirically, this hypothesis implies that income shocks had little effect on consumption
changes. Yet we find the contrary: during this crisis period, households’ consumptions fell and
rose with their incomes. Second, it is possible that the dynamics of livestock prices discouraged
the use of livestock as a buffer stock. In particular, livestock mortality during the drought and
reduced pressure on common grazing land afterwards may have resulted in higher expected prices
in subsequent periods. This would raise the returns to current savings and reduce current con-
sumption. However, we show that even comparing across households within villages (who share
the same future price paths), those households who suffered idiosyncratic negative income shocks
made no additional use of livestock sales to buffer their consumption. Third, liquidity constraints
and a strong precautionary savings motive at low levels of asset holdings, particularly when com-
bined with the need to maintain a reproductive herd may resulted in positive livestock holdings as
long as consumption was at least above subsistence level. We cannot reject this hypothesis as an
explanation for the minimal consumption-smoothing we observe.
The paper is related to two main threads of literature. First, the paper is related to a grow-
ing literature which focuses on poor households’ ability to draw on their savings or to enter in
informal risk sharing arrangements to smooth consumption. In recent years, a large body of em-
pirical research has consistently found that households in poor developing areas are able to protect
consumption against a substantial fraction of income risks, but that full insurance is not achieved3.
2For West Africa’s Sahelian countries (Burkina, Mali, Niger), livestock is one of the main sources of export
revenues. Thus, the role of livestock as a buffer stock may also have macroeconomic implications.
3We can not here provide a review of this extensive literature. See Kinsey, Burger & Gunning, Jalan & Ravallion,
Ersado, Alderman & Alwang, Attanasio & Szekely, Hoogeveen, (Alderman and Paxson, 1994; Townsend, 1994)
(Alderman and Paxson, 1994; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Kinsey, Burger, and Gunning, 1998; Jalan and Ravallion,
1999; Attanasio and Szekely, 2004) for example. Dercon (2004) provides a useful recent entry into the literature.
4Second, the paper is connected to the use of assets as a buffer stock when there are credit
constraints (Deaton, 1991, 1992a; Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini, 2001; Carroll and Kimball,
2001; Carroll, 1997). Deaton shows that households subject to borrowing constraints are able to
smooth consumption with relatively low asset holdings. He proposes an inter-temporal model that
incorporates a stochastic labor income and a non-productive asset (cash or grain on hand). In this
model, even in the complete absence of financial markets, prudent households may accumulate and
draw down stocks of physical or financial assets to maintain consumption levels that vary little from
year to year. Substantial changes in consumption arise only when stocks of assets are drawn down
to near zero, which may happen infrequently. Moreover, it is not necessary that asset holdings be
large relatively to income. For instance, simulation exercises show that for a household holding an
average stock of asset value less than the standard deviation of income, consumption variation is
half that of income (Deaton, 1992a, p.257).
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) depart from Deaton (1991)’s initial formulation by allowing a
productive asset. In the context of rural India, bullocks are used as source of power in agricultural
production, but can also be sold to smooth consumption in the face of income shocks. Therefore,
consumption is smoothed at the cost of crop production efficiency. The authors find that borrowing-
constrained households keep on average half of the optimal level of bullocks.
However, unlike Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) we explore livestock as a buffer stock in the
context of the WASAT, where animals are mostly used for (sales) consumption purposes rather than
as a source of power in agricultural production. Therefore we focus more on the price dynamics
and the livestock production processes which govern the offtake decisions and hence the ability
to use livestock to smooth consumption. We find little direct evidence of the use of asset stocks
to smooth consumption. However, there is evidence that households either have a precautionary
savings motive, or are concerned about liquidity constraints that might bind in the future. We
find that households whose landholdings make them more subject to future income fluctuations
save more.
The second section describes the survey and summarizes the data used in the analysis. The
third section examines the degree of consumption smoothing by the sample households. The fourth
5section explores how exogenous income shocks affect herd management in the context of the Sahel.
The fifth section concludes.
2 Survey description and context
2.1 Survey and descriptive statistics
The data for this paper were collected in rural Burkina Faso between 1981 and 1985 by the Interna-
tional Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). Approximately 25 households
were randomly selected in each of six villages in three distinct agro-climatic zones for the survey.
These zones vary in soil quality, annual rainfall patterns, and population densities. The Sahel in
the north is characterized by low annual rainfall (480 mm per year on average), sandy soils, and low
land productivity. The Sudan savanna has low rainfall (724 mm) and shallow soils. The Northern
Guinea savanna in the southern part of the country is the most productive of the regions and has
relatively high rainfall (952 mm). The survey collected detailed information on crop production,
asset holding and asset transactions, transfers (money and in kind), grain stocks, consumption, and
daily rainfall (Matlon, 1988; Matlon and Fafchamps, 1989).
The survey timing is of great importance to this study. The survey spans a period which was
marked by some of the worst drought years ever recorded in the region. As shown in table 1, in each
of the six villages, rainfall recorded during the survey period was consistently below its long run
average. Because of the predominance of rainfed agriculture, these rainfall fluctuations translated
into enormous aggregate shocks. Figure 1 shows historical rainfall pattern in the region. It is
apparent that the survey took place in the middle of a severe drought period and coincided with
some of the lowest recorded rainfall levels for the region. Time series of annual rainfall in the west
African semi-arid tropics are stationary, with the exception of a large downward shift in the mean
of the distribution that occurred sometime in the late 1960s (Tapsoba, Hache, L. Perreault, and
Bobee, 2004; Barbe, Lebel, and Tapsoba, 2002; Nicholson and Grist, 2001). By the time of the
survey, households would have had more than a decade to incorporate the occurrence of this shift
in the mean of rainfall into their expectations.
6The ICRISAT survey did not collect consumption data directly until during the last two cropping
years of the survey, i.e. 1984 and 1985. Detailed data on the use (net sales and gifts) of each crop
(collected weekly), as well as seed use and stocks at the onset of each season are, however, available.
Each plot owner was interviewed separately. This information can be used to generate household
consumption data using the “flow accounting” identity (see Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997). The
same consumption data have been used by Reardon, Delgado, and Matlon (1992). In our context,
this method has both an advantage and a drawback. The main advantage is that a measure
of own consumption of food, presumably the largest fraction of total household consumption, is
readily available. This is particularly useful since households tend to underreport own consumption
(Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997). The main drawback is that a spurious correlation between income
and consumption may rise because of similar measurement errors in both variables (Ravallion and
Chaudhuri). We believe, however, that the instruments that we use allow an appropriate handling
of this type of measurement error4.
The sample consists of very low-income households. Table 3 shows that annual income and
consumption per adult equivalent is less than CFA 20,000 most of the time. If evaluated at the
exchange rate of the time of the survey (CFA 250 for $1), this consumption level corresponds to
$ .25 per adult equivalent per day. Even if we suppose that households were spending the same
amount on non-food items (which is exaggerated) consumption would be far below the conventional
$1 a day adopted for global poverty measures.
This level of poverty is associated with very low levels of food consumption on average, and
during the drought years many of these households experienced dramatic declines in their already
inadequate consumption. There are 184 household-year observations with negative consumption
growth and for 167 (91 percent) of those observations, livestock holdings were positive. For the
20th percentile of these observations with negative consumption growth, observed food intake was
equivalent to 1770 kilocalories per adult equivalent per day. This corresponds to only about 60
percent of the recommended level of 2850 kilocalories for a moderately active adult (FAO-WHO-
UNU, 1985). If each of these households had sold their livestock and purchased food at the local
4Our identification strategy, which relies essentially on rainfall variation, is discussed later.
7prices, their average consumption would have increased to 3300 kilocalories per adult equivalent
a day. Calorie intake would have exceed the the recommended level in 43.5 percent of the cases5.
To sum up, the actual food intake data portray households with extremely low food intake who
choose to hold onto their livestock at the cost of further deterioration of their already inadequate
nutrition6.
2.2 Shock measures
In this section we use the data on rainfall deviations and the allocation of cultivated land across
soil types to recover income shocks. To begin, village average income and consumption growth are
presented in figure 2. Two main features of the data are apparent from this figure. First there
were enormous income shocks over the period (as expected by inspection of the rainfall data).
Second, consumption tracked income closely at the village level; there is little evidence of effective
smoothing of consumption over time in the face of aggregate shocks.
To proceed further, we quantify these shocks. We exploit the strong dependence of farm out-
comes on rainfall in the WASAT environment (Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas, 1998). To the extent
that production on different types of land responds differently to similar rainfall levels, and land
allocation is made at the beginning of the season when rainfall level is unknown, the cross-product
of soil types and rainfall realization provides a measure of the income shock which is both exogenous
and unanticipated. We estimate
yitv = zitvα1 +
(
X ′itv ⊗ Fvt
)
α2 + γtv + γi + εitv, (1)
where yitv is the crop income of household i at time t in village v, zitv is a set of household
demographic variables, Xitv represents the allocation of plot areas to specific soil types, Fvt is
current rainfall deviation from its long run mean measured in each village, γtv is a village-year
fixed effect, γi is a household fixed effect and εitv is an error term.
5Moreover, in 55 percent of the cases, calorie intake would exceed 80 percent of the recommended norm which is
the level of consumption used by previous studies to define food insecurity in the region (Reardon and Matlon, 1989).
6An important issue is how these costs are redistributed within the household. Unfortunately, our data are not
well-suited to an examinination of food reallocation within the household.
8Estimates of regression (1) are reported in table 4. The table shows separate results for poor and
wealthier households, where a household is defined as wealthy if it posses animal traction at the start
of the survey. Beneath each column, we report the F statistic for the joint significance test of the
instruments. The null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly non-significant is rejected at the
one percent level across all specifications (the F statistic ranges from 4.67 to 7.91). Rainfall affects
income through its interactions with land topology and distance from the compound. The income
of households with plots on lowland and near the compound is less sensitive to rainfall variations
than that of those with plots in upland areas or distant from the compounds. Fafchamps, Udry,
and Czukas (1998) and Matlon and Fafchamps (1989) show similar results.
We use regression 1 to assess the variation of income during the survey period. We predict
idiosyncratic shocks using the interaction terms ((X ′itv ⊗ Fvt) αˆ2) and aggregate shocks using the
village-year fixed effects (γˆtv). Table 5 shows the coefficient of variation for these shocks for each
village. There is appreciable rainfall-induced idiosyncratic risk in these villages. However, it is
apparent that aggregate income volatility is the main source of concern, with a standard deviation
about twice of the mean income in most villages.
In summary, we are examining consumption by extremely poor households who were confronted
with enormous exogenous income shocks. Yet these households chose to hold onto their main asset
(livestock) at the apparent cost of more variation in consumption.
3 Consumption smoothing
Limited livestock sales in the face of severe adverse income shocks could simply reflect the avail-
ability of alternative mechanisms for smoothing consumption. We first examine self-insurance, and
then risk sharing at the village level.
3.1 Self-insurance
In this section, we examine the degree of consumption smoothing over time with respect to income
shocks. This is primarily an empirical exercise, although its interpretation can best be viewed
9within the simple life-cycle consumption smoothing paradigm that we develop below. Consider
a world with missing insurance markets but with well functioning credit markets. In particular
households can borrow or save at the market interest rate. We first consider the simple PIH model,
and then we test a buffer stock model more consistent with precautionary saving.
3.1.1 The PIH model
Each household i maximizes an intertemporal expected utility, with an instantaneous utility u
defined over the consumption of a single aggregate good ci. Households are supposed to be risk
averse, with a planning horizon T . Each period, household i earns a risky income yi, and has
access to a risk-free asset Ai. With time discount rate β and interest rate r, household i′s economic
program at period τ can be written as follows:
Maxciτu(ciτ ) + β
t−τEt=τ
[
T∑
t=τ+1
u(cit)
]
(2)
subject to the budget constraint:
Ait+1 = (1 + r)Ait + yit − cit (3)
With T large enough and AiT+1 = 0, then this problem results in the standard permanent
income result that the marginal utility of current consumption is equal to the discounted expected
marginal utility of future consumption(Deaton, 1992b).
u′(cit) = β(1 + r)Eu′(cit+1) (4)
If we assume that preferences are quadratic, separable across periods, and time invariant, and
that the rate of time preference is constant and equal to the interest rate, then the changes in
consumption from period to period can be expressed as a function of unexpected changes in per-
manent income. An empirical formulation would suggest that only shocks to permanent income
would change optimal the consumption plan, and transitory shocks are smoothed (Deaton, 1992b)
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civt = γ0 + γ1yPivt + γ2y
T
ivt + γ3y
U
ivt + γzit + di + υivt (5)
Where yP is permanent income, yT is transitory income, yU is residual income, di is a household
fixed effect, and all other variables are as defined before. Permanent and transitory income are
defined following (Paxson, 1992). To do so, we estimate regression 1, but omitting γtv and including
a constant in Xitv. Thus the village-level rainfall shock now enters 1 directly as well as through
interactions with household land characteristics. Transitory income is defined as
(
X˜ ′itv ⊗ Fvt
)
αˆ2,
where X˜itv = [1 Xitv], permanent income is defined as zitvαˆ1, any yU is the residual income.
The PIH implies that γ1 is unity and γ2 is zero. Finally, to allow for systematic inter-household
differences in the extent of consumption smoothing, we stratify our sample by household wealth,
as in Table 4.
Estimates of this regression are shown in table 6. In the first column we assume identical
consumption responses to income shocks across all households, and in the second column we allow
parameters to vary by wealth groups. There is no evidence that consumption does responds to
changes in permanent income. This is not particularly surprising in this household fixed-effect
regression, because our measure of changes in permanent income is unlikely to be particularly
informative. It is based on changes in the demographic structure of the household over time, which
is likely to be largely predictable. The results that follow are robust to the exclusion of yP from
these equations, as can be seen in column 3.
In contrast, about 54 percent of changes in transitory income are passed onto consumption.
There is no significant difference in the responsiveness of consumption to transitory income for
poor and wealthier households. In columns 4 and 5, we restrict attention to the periods for which
we have direct consumption measures, and do not rely on the flow accounting method of inferring
consumption. The responsiveness of consumption to transitory income is quite similar for this
subperiod. Overall, the evidence indicates that changes in consumption track those in transitory
income, which suggests that households are unable to smooth consumption in the face of year-to-
year fluctuations in income. Such a pattern is incompatible with the standard permanent income
11
model.
The estimates presented in table 6 may be inconsistent because the model does not account prop-
erly for family labor. Crop income is measured as farm gross output minus hired input costs and
minus the value of household labor used on the farm (imputed at period-village specific wages). In
an agricultural economy characterized by well-developed labor markets and perfect substitutability
between family and hired labor, this would be an appropriate procedure (Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
2000). However, hired labor is virtually absent our context (Fafchamps 1993). Overall, only 12%
of labor used on farms in these villages is hired; most of that is used for harvesting cotton in only
two of the villages. Apart from the cotton harvest, over 95% of the labor used on household farms
is supplied by the households.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to examine the consequences for consumption smoothing of
absent labor markets. Per-period preferences are now
u(cit, lit) (6)
where lt is leisure in period t. u(c, l) is assumed to be concave and increasing in c and l. We also
make the substantive assumption that ∂
2u
∂c∂l ≤ 0. This is a simple way of thinking about nutrition-
productivity links. When households are working particularly hard (l is low), the marginal utility
of consumption is high. The budget constraint is modified from (3) to
Ait+1 = (1 + r)Ait + f(1− lit, εit)− cit (7)
where f(., .) is farm output as a function of household labor input and the transitory random shock
εit. In any period, consumption and labor choices satisfy
uc = λit
ul = fLλit (8)
λit = Etβ(1 + rt)λit+1.
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Consumption may no longer be unresponsive to transitory shocks. A transitory shock is defined in
the context of perfect smoothing as one that does not influence λit. Imposing the assumption that
δλit
δεit
= 0, equations (8) imply
dcit
dεit
= −λitulcfLε
Dit
(9)
where Dit ≡ uccull+λituccfLL−u2lc > 0. Even if there is perfect smoothing, consumption changes
with transitory shocks depending on the effect of these shocks on the marginal product of labor.
ulc < 0, so consumption increases (decreases) if these transitory shocks increase (decrease) the
marginal product of labor. Therefore, we can use our data on labor demand on household plots to
examine the null hypothesis of perfect smoothing, even in the absence of complete labor markets.
Our IV estimate of the impact of transitory income shocks on consumption is
dcit
dεit
dfit
dεit
=
−λitulcfLεDit
fε − fL λitfLε(ull+λitfLL)Dit
. (10)
where fit = f(1 − lit, εit). Similarly, we can examine the impact of the same transitory shocks
on farm labor demand (Lit ≡ 1 − lit). Under the null hypothesis of complete smoothing, the IV
estimate of this coefficient is
dLit
dεit
dfit
dεit
=
−λitfLε(ull+λitfLL)D
fε − fL λitfLε(ull+λitfLL)D
. (11)
Without further assumptions, in particular on the sign and magnitude of fLε, we can not say much
about either of these two quantities. However, their ratio is
dcit
dεit
dfit
dεit
dLit
dεit
dfit
dεit
=
ulc
(ull + λitfLL)
> 0, (12)
and thus they must have the same sign. If households smooth perfectly, consumption and farm
labor demand must move in the same direction in response to transitory shocks.
This restriction is strongly rejected in the data. We showed in Table 6 that
dcit
dεit
dfit
dεit
> 0. In Table
7, we present results from estimating equation (5), with c replaced by L. We find that
dLit
dεit
dfit
dεit
< 0,
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contradicting the null hypothesis that households are able to fully smooth the effect of transitory
income shocks. In Column 1 of Table 7, we see that positive transitory shocks to income are strongly
associated with declines in labor use on the household farm. A one standard deviation increase in
income is associated with decline of about 335 hours of total labor, which is approximately 9% of
total labor use. The decline in labor use is larger for poorer households. The decline in household
labor on the farm associated with the same transitory shock is approximately 7% of total household
labor use. This decline is evident for both men and women household members, though not for
children. These declines are strongly statistically significant, and of moderate size.7
We find that consumption increases in response to transitory income shocks. At the same time,
we find labor use on the farm declining in response to the same shocks. This contradicts the null
hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing. It is an unsurprising outcome under conditions of
imperfect smoothing. Households with positive εit are temporarily well-off: some of this transitory
utility shock is consumed in the form of cit, some the form of increased leisure.
3.1.2 Asset Stocks and Consumption Smoothing
We turn now to the mechanisms that might be used to smooth consumption over time. This serves
as an important robustness check on the preceding results, because the data are partly independent
of the information on consumption we have used to this point. There is no significant use of financial
assets in these communities, so the primary assets that could be used to smooth consumption are
consumer grain stocks, livestock holdings, consumer durables and tools. Unfortunately, we have no
data on the evolution of holdings of consumer durables or tools. We focus our attention, therefore,
on the two key assets of grain stocks and livestock.
The net savings functions for grain and livestock have the same form as the consumption function
(5) with cit replaced by ∆ait, where ait is holdings of either grain or livestock by household i in
year t.
Estimates are presented in table 8. Net savings in grain stocks appear to be a relatively impor-
tant mechanism for smoothing consumption over time, as found by Udry in northern Nigeria. Put
7In a very different context, Kochar 1999 also finds hours working responds negatively to idiosyncratic income
shocks. Much of the response she finds works through the off-household farm labor market.
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a different way, we found in the previous section that there is very little evidence of consumption
smoothing. What smoothing there is appears to be effected though variations in grain holdings.
The results indicate a positive response of grain saving to both transitory income (.28) and per-
manent income (.33). This, however, appears to be the case only for relatively wealthy households
(column 2). We have already noted that Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998) find very little re-
sponsiveness of net livestock sales to income fluctuations driven by rainfall shocks in these data.
We reconfirm this finding in columns 3 and 4 of table 8.
A source of concern with these results is uncertainty regarding the extent to which livestock
price dynamics affect offtake decisions. Are households not selling livestock during this drought
because current prices are low? If current prices are low, so that expected returns to holding
livestock are temporarily high, livestock sales may be lower than what would be expected in the
absence of price dynamics correlated with shocks. We temporarily defer this question, because it
is best addressed in the context of an examination of within-village dynamics of livestock holdings,
which is discussed in section 3.2.
3.1.3 Buffer stocks: Liquidity Constraints and the Precautionary Motive
If farmers in a risky environment face liquidity constraints, or if they have a preference-based
precautionary motive for saving (or both), then the strict restrictions of the PIH no longer hold
(Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini, 2001; Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Carroll, 1997; Carroll and
Kimball, 2001; Deaton, 1991, 1992a; Zeldes, 1989). In these cases, farm households will not fully
smooth transitory shocks. Instead, they may permit consumption to drop in the face of transitory
shocks in order to preserve their buffer stocks against the possibility of future shocks. There is a
very close connection between the precautionary savings motive and liquidity constraints. Zeldes
(1989) shows that even if a household has no inherent precautionary demand for savings (because
preferences are quadratic), liquidity constraints induce precautionary savings. An adverse income
shock has a particularly negative impact on a household that faces a binding liquidity constraint,
because the shock cannot be spread over time. The household engages in precautionary savings even
when the liquidity constraint is not yet binding in order to reduce the chances of it binding in the
15
future. Carroll and Kimball (2001) show that for quite general preferences the existence of liquidity
constraints increases the demand for precautionary savings when asset holdings fall near the point
at which constraints start to bind. Carroll and Kimball conclude that “the effects of precautionary
saving and liquidity constraints are very similar, because both spring from the concavity of the
consumption function” (p. 38). In either case, we would observe current consumption being
especially low for those households that anticipate higher variance in consumption in the future.
Almost none of the now-substantial literature on buffer stock savings addresses the issues asso-
ciated with nonseparabilities between consumption and labor supply (Browning and Meghir, 1991).
There is a significant amount of work that examines intertemporal labor supply in non-stochastic
environments (following Heckman, 1974). Research on joint labor supply and savings choices in
risky environments with liquidity constraints or a precautionary motive is much less well-established
(see Blundell, Magnac, and Meghir, 1997; Low, 1999; Rust, Buchinsky, and Benitez-Silva, 2003, for
a sampling of this literature). There is no work to date that addresses the determinants of buffer
stock savings in a context of nonseparabilities between consumption and leisure with absent labor
markets and home production. It is clear that a full treatment would require explicit solution
of the stochastic dynamic program facing these households. This extension is beyond the scope
of the current paper. Instead, we note that the statistically-significant labor supply responses to
transitory shocks revealed in Table 7 are relatively small. For the purposes of this first examination
of buffer stock saving, we treat labor supply as inelastic.
We examine the possibility that there is important precautionary saving by adopting the method
of Pistaferri (2001). He argues that observation of subjective expectations of future income variance
provides a powerful test of this motive. Campbell’s (1987) famous rainy day equation shows that
under the PIH, saving depends on expected future changes in income. Does current savings depend,
in addition, on higher moments of distribution of future income shocks? Therefore, we estimate
sivt = γ1yPivt + γ2y
T
ivt + γ3y
U
ivt + γ4var(y
T
ivt+1) + γzvit + γv + µt. (13)
We assume that households have rational expectations concerning the distribution of income shocks
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due to rainfall that they can expect. Therefore, we estimate v̂ar(yTivt+1) with the time series of
rainfall variation, interacted with household land characteristics weighted by the estimates from
equation (1). To be more specific, we proceed by re-estimating a version of regression (1) as follows:
yitv = α1zitv + α2Xitv ⊗ Fvt + α3γv ⊗ Fvt + γi + εitv (14)
We then use our historical rainfall data to recover the variance of rainfall-induced income shocks
for each household, assuming that the average characteristics of the households’ cultivated land
over the five years approximates the total land endowment for each household.8
Table 9 summarizes our estimation results. In column (1), we see that conditional on current
income shocks, households that have land characteristics that are associated with higher income
variance save significantly more. A household with a one standard deviation higher expected future
income variance saves CFA 5744 more (per adult equivalent). This is a moderately large effect on
consumption and saving: the standard deviation of consumption is approximately CFA 13,000. As
can be seen in column (2), there is no apparent difference in the absolute magnitude of the savings
response of poor and rich households to expected future income shocks; hence, the responsiveness
as a proportion of current consumption or assets is higher for poor households.
In the absence of time-varying measures of future income risk for our households, it is not pos-
sible for us to address the main empirical worry associated with this procedure, which is that we
are assuming that landholdings are exogenous to other household characteristics, and in particular
that they are uncorrelated with preferences over savings. It is of course possible that more risk
averse households, or households that face more strict liquidity constraints, adjust their landhold-
ings to reduce the volatility of income shocks. This possibility, along with the fact that we have
not appropriately addressed non-separabilities between consumption and leisure in this context of
very imperfect labor markets, implies that these results should be understood as preliminary rather
than definitive.
8So v̂ar(yTivt+1) ≡ var(αˆ2X¯iv ⊗ Fvt + αˆ3γˆv ⊗ Fvt), where the var is taken over the historical period for which we
have rainfall data, and X¯iv are the average land characteristics of household i over our 5 years of survey data.
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3.2 Risk sharing
We turn now to an examination of the extent of risk pooling within these villages. Table 5 shows
that in the context of the enormous aggregate income shocks associated with the drought period
there is also significant idiosyncratic variation in income. While informal local risk sharing arrange-
ments can do little to help households deal with the aggregate effects of the drought, they might
permit households to efficiently pool the idiosyncratic variation within villages. We begin by consid-
ering the canonical model of fully efficient risk pooling within the village. The central implication
of this model is that changes in individual consumption depend only on aggregate consumption,
and are independent of a households’ own shocks conditional on aggregate consumption.
We use a familiar specification to test the null hypothesis of complete risk pooling within
villages (see Deaton (1990) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), for example). If preferences are
separable between consumption and leisure, and are additively separable across time and states,
then consumption growth depends on aggregate resources and not on changes in own resources.
Empirically, changes in individual consumption over time should be uncorrelated with changes in
individual income conditional on the resources of the reference group:
citv = β1 + β2yitv + β3zitv ++γi + γtv + εitv (15)
Where c is consumption, y is income, γtv is a village×year fixed effect, γi is a household fixed
effect, and z is household demographics. Complete risk pooling implies β2 = 0. We experiment with
variants of equations (15), namely by instrumenting for income, and by accounting for potential
endogeneity of the household composition. The instruments for income are described in 2.2, where
we also present the first stage results.
Table 10 sets out estimation results of regression 15. OLS estimates are presented in columns
(1) and (2), and IV estimates in columns (3) to (4). The last column shows results from the
Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator, which treats both income and household size as endogenous and
uses lagged variables as instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999). All
regressions include village-year fixed effects to control for covariate shocks. In columns (2) and (4),
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we allow the degree of consumption smoothing to differ between rich and poor households.
Across all specifications, the income coefficients are positive and different from zero at any
conventional level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of perfect insurance against idiosyncratic income
risk is rejected.
The point estimates suggest that on average the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks on con-
sumption ranges from 37 percent to 51 percent with OLS estimates, and from 31 percent to 44
percent when we instrument for income. The estimated income coefficient using the AB estimator is
43 percent, implying that the lack of risk sharing is robust to this alternative identification strategy
for the income shocks.
We focus our interpretation on the IV results for two reasons. First, there is substantial
evidence from other poor agrarian economies of nutrition-productivity effects that imply joint cau-
sation between income and consumption (Strauss, 1986; Strauss and Thomas, 1995). Second, it
is plausible that there are measurement and/or imputation errors in the income variable. Mea-
surement errors per se would tend to induce an attenuation bias that biases coefficients towards
zero (Deaton, 1997; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997). In this case, the OLS estimates provide a
lower bound for the true parameters. However, imputation errors in the construction of both the
consumption and the income variables may bias the income coefficients upwards (Deaton, 1997;
Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997)9. For positive coefficients, this bias is in opposite direction of the
standard downward attenuation bias due to measurement errors, so that the net effect cannot be
signed a priori.
We test whether the extent of risk sharing differs between rich and poor households. The point
estimates imply a stronger sensitivity of consumption to idiosyncratic shocks for poor households,
but in our IV specification we cannot reject the hypothesis that the responsiveness is the same.10
Thus, we cannot claim that the consumption of wealthier households is more protected against
idiosyncratic income shocks than the consumption of poorer households, a finding which contrasts
the results of Jalan and Ravallion (1999) in rural China. Overall, it is clear that a large proportion
9This is critical in our context where most of the data on consumption is derived from an accounting flow.
10Note that the difference is statistically significant in column (2), i.e. using measured income. However, we have
already argued that income may be endogenous.
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of idiosyncratic variation in income is uninsured for households at all levels of wealth.
In section 2 we saw that conventional treatments of the permanent income hypothesis can be
misleading in a context in which preferences are not separable between leisure and consumption
and labor markets are imperfect or absent. The same is true in the context of tests for efficient
consumption insurance. Suppose as we did in section 2 that nutrition-productivity connections
imply that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in labor supply (ulc < 0), and that
production is based on household labor, due to absent labor markets. The implication (in a deriva-
tion almost identical to that of equation (12), so not repeated here) is that in an efficient allocation
with full insurance, idiosyncratic consumption must move in the same direction as idiosyncratic
labor use. The intuition is that conditional on aggregate labor and consumption, if labor supply
increases for household h due to a change in the marginal product of labor on h’s farm, then h’s
consumption must also increase to fully pool risk.
We can test this implication of full insurance by estimating an equation similar to (15), but
with c replaced by L− labor use on the farm. The results are presented in columns (6) and (7) of
Table 10. We see that labor use is declining in farm output, conditional on household and village-
year fixed effects. Households with positive idiosyncratic shocks consume more, and work less.
This contradicts the null hypothesis of complete insurance, even with non-separabilities between
consumption and leisure and absent labor markets.
In regression (15), all aggregate shocks are absorbed in the village-time fixed effects, making the
test agnostic on households’ ability to cope with aggregate shocks. Given the timing of the survey,
a period characterized by severe drought, it may be informative to examine households ability to
cope with aggregate shocks.
One option to examine the exposure to aggregate risk is simply to exclude the village-time fixed
effects, which summarize the covariate shocks, from regression (15), and estimate the following
regression:
citv = β1 + β˜2yitv + β3zitv + γi + εitv (16)
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The coefficient β˜2 provides an estimate of consumption variability inclusive of both idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks. If aggregate shocks are important and there is substantial risk sharing, then
β˜2 > β2, and the difference δ = β˜2 − β2 summarizes the role of risk sharing (Deaton, 1990; Jalan
and Ravallion, 1999).
Table 11 presents the estimation results, with income instrumented as discussed before. The
implied δ′s are presented in the last row. From the estimates, it is apparent that risk sharing
is not central to consumption smoothing. This means that households relied almost exclusively
on self-insurance to smooth consumption during the survey period. This finding should be put
in perspective with the timing of the survey discussed in section (2). In particular one might
think that the persistence of negative aggregate shocks which resulted from a succession of drought
years may have undermined existing social arrangements used to shared risk. Anecdotal evidence
in Northern Burkina, where villagers have reported the break-ups of extended households and
traditional reciprocity networks in the aftermath of the drought of the 1970’s (Marchal, 1974),
seems to support this hypothesis.
3.2.1 Mechanisms of risk sharing
To complement our previous tests on consumption smoothing, we look directly at mechanisms
which households may use to cope with income risk. We first examine transfers, which could be an
important mechanism for informal risk sharing. We estimate transfers response to income shocks
using the following regression:
Tivt = β1 + β2yitv + β3zitv + γtv + γi + εitv, (17)
where T is net transfers defined as the difference between transfers received and transfers given. If
complete risk pooling is implemented through transfers, we would expect β2 to be −1. Conditional
on aggregate consumption (γtv), a decrease of CFA 1 in income would be met with an increase
of CFA 1 in transfers, and vice-versa. Estimates of (17) are reported in table 12. The estimates
imply that income risk has almost no effect on net transfers (the estimated coefficient is small in
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magnitude and not statistically significant). Thus, overall gifts giving within the village were not
used to pool risk. This result is consistent with the evidence presented in table 11. Moreover, the
descriptive statistics (table 3) indicated that transfers were too small to play any significant role
in consumption smoothing.
To corroborate our finding of minimal risk sharing, we test how asset holdings (grain storage
and livestock) respond to idiosyncratic, transitory shocks. In table 13 we test the extent to which
self-insurance mechanisms (grain storage and livestock sales) respond to idiosyncratic shocks, by
estimating versions of regression 17 where the dependent variable is grain storage (columns 1 and
2) and livestock sales (columns 3 and 4), respectively. On average 41 percent of idiosyncratic shocks
are passed onto grain storage (column 1) and only about 2 percent are passed onto livestock sales.
The most important reason for examining the responsiveness of livestock sales to idiosyncratic
shocks is that it sheds light on the hypothesis that the reluctance of households to smooth con-
sumption shocks with livestock transactions is related to the dynamics of livestock prices in drought
situations. It is argued that livestock mortality during drought periods and reduced pressure on
common grazing land afterwards lead to higher prices in subsequent periods because of local supply
shortages (Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas, 1998)11. Therefore current low rainfall may provide some
incentives to hold onto livestock, and observed offtake will be lower than that would have prevailed
in the absence of price dynamics. However, we see from columns (3) and (4) that within villages,
households subject to transitory idiosyncratic shocks are no more likely to sell livestock than other
households. Because these are conditional on village-year fixed effects, one cannot attribute the
lack of livestock adjustment to shocks to differences in the expected future path of future livestock
prices.
4 Income shocks and herd management
A final prominent hypothesis for the apparent reluctance of many households to sell livestock to
smooth consumption is based on livestock production technology. We start from the observation
11See Sheets and Morris (1973) for a descriptive account of herd recovery after drought years in the Sahel in the
mid-1970’s.
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that in the absence of any consumption-smoothing motive (because there is no risk, or because
there are efficient insurance markets) optimal herd management still implies periodic sales. This
type of offtake, however, is governed only by profit objectives12. There may be a tension between
these objectives and any desire of households to smooth consumption, reducing the usefulness of
animal stocks for dealing with transitory risk.
To motivate our empirical model, consider the standard finite-horizon household model under
complete markets. Each household (h) maximizes its utility, which is defined over state contingent
consumption
uh(chst).
The household’s budget constraint is
∑
st
qstchst ≤
∑
st
[pihst + qstnhst + wst (Ehst − lst(Nhst))] ,
where pst is the price of consumption, pihst is h’s farm profit, and Ehst is the endowment of labor of
h in state s in period t. Nhst is the vector of animals of different ages held by household h in state
s of period t. We can think of it as having A elements, each describing how many cattle of age a
are held by the household at a particular moment; more generally it will record gender- and age-
specific quantities held of all different types of livestock. lst is the state- and period-specific labor
requirement of holding that vector of animals, which might depend on local pasture conditions.
nhst is the vector of net sales of livestock of different ages by h, and qst are the prices at which
those sales are realized. Livestock holdings evolve according to
Nhs′t+1 = Gst(Nhst)− nhst
where Gst describes the births, deaths, and aging of livestock from state s of t to s′ of t + 1.13
Completing the model with the obvious non-negativity conditions and definition of farm profit, it
12Whether profit is defined in monetary or non-monetary (i.e. livestock may be also used to signal social prestige)
would not affect the argument.
13Without loss of generality, we have defined states such that conditional on state s of t these transitions are the
same into any state s′ of t+ 1.
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is immediately apparent that the usual separability holds between production and consumption
decisions.
It follows that the household problem is akin to maximizing profit, and then using the op-
timal profit in the budget constraint of the consumption problem. Under the complete market
assumption, the household chooses an optimal sequence {n∗hst} that maximizes profit derived from
livestock. This sequence of net sales is independent of household preferences, and uninfluenced by
any desire to cope with risk: {n∗hst} is the same regardless of the degree of risk aversion in uh.
We can say a bit more from the separable structure of the household’s problem. The price
sequences pst, qst and wst, and the production functions lst(.) and Gst(.) are all community specific.
Conditional on the aggregate state at time t in a given community, they do not depend upon
the idiosyncratic income shock of household h. As with the rest of this argument, this depends
crucially on the completeness of factor markets in the community. It requires, for example, that
pasture is open with a well-defined price (which we’ve embedded in wstlst(.) above) to all in the
community. If this was not so, then rainfall shocks on household land might influence {n∗hst}. This
is just a particular example of the common and correct observation that separation of production
and consumption decisions requires smoothly-working factor markets.
We now examine the null hypothesis that the sales of animals of particular ages are uninfluenced
by the realization of idiosyncratic income shocks. We have data on the age, the type and the sex of
each animal sold by sample households. We pool all animals (cattle, goat, and sheep) and calculate
for each animal sold by household h in period t its standardized age (siht) based on the average life
expectancy of each type of animal. We estimate
siht = τ1yht + τ2zht +mlstv + µiht (18)
where yht is crop income, z is household composition capturing labor costs and mlstv is a livestock,
sex, village, year dummy variable which captures local market and livestock production conditions.
Note that these fixed effects will capture the effects of both current and expected future prices.
Optimal herd management implies that households choose the age at which each animal is
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sold based only on the local market and physical production conditions (mlstv), which together
determine the net profit per animal. The null hypothesis is that τ1 = 0. A positive τ1 indicates
that households who experience negative income shocks sell younger animals. That is, negative
income shocks force household to deviate from the optimal herd management path. In all cases,
yht is treated as endogenous and instrumented with interactions of rainfall shocks with household
farmland characteristics, as in earlier tables. Note that the inclusion of mlstv implies that our
test can only reveal deviations from the null hypothesis caused by idiosyncratic variations in crop
income; aggregate movements are captured in the fixed effect.
In table 14, we report estimates of equation (18) with and without household fixed effects. We
find no evidence of any sensitivity of livestock ages to income shocks in any of these specifications.
The most direct interpretation of this failure to reject the null hypothesis is that the complete
markets assumption is correct. This is implausible, given the earlier results of the paper. An
alternative interpretation is that the cost of deviating from the optimal sequence of livestock sales
is sufficiently high that households subject to adverse shocks are not willing to do so. We can only
examine the responsiveness of livestock ages at sale to idiosyncratic income shocks (because of the
likelihood that local market and production conditions are related to the aggregate shocks). These
idiosyncratic shocks may be too small to induce noticeable changes in the ages of livestock at sale.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated patterns of consumption smoothing by rural households in the WASAT.
These households experienced extreme aggregate income shocks during a period of severe drought.
These aggregate shocks were accompanied by substantial idiosyncratic income variation. However,
we found little evidence of consumption either over time or across households within villages. The
small amount of consumption smoothing that we found was effected largely through the accumu-
lation and decumulation of stocks of grain.
The evidence uncovered suggests that households intentionally destabilized consumption in
order to conserve livestock through the drought period, contradicting simple optimal saving theories.
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Household behavior appears to be more consistent with a buffer stock model than conventional risk
sharing or PIH models. This conclusion is based on two complementary findings from our reduced
form analysis. First, poor households already close to subsistence levels who were subjected to
large income shocks endured drops in consumption in order to hold onto their remaining livestock.
Second, households whose land characteristics implied higher future income variability saved more,
conditional on current income shocks.
The next step in this research agenda, therefore, is to develop a more structural model that
accounts for the key features that seem to be driving dynamic decisions regarding consumption and
saving in this context. We believe that there are three such features. First, households are faced
with potentially binding liquidity constraints, given current livestock holdings and the stochastic
process that governs income in the area. Second, labor markets are virtually absent and there
are important non-separabilities between the consumption of leisure and food. Finally, livestock
sales and purchases involve significant transaction costs, and there are potentially important herd
management considerations that influence the decision to modify the portfolio of livestock held by
a particular household. We expect that a buffer stock model in the line of Deaton (1991) and
Carroll (1997), extended to account for constraints raising from herd management considerations
and nutrition-productivity connections may provide a more complete characterization of the data.
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Table 1: Village rainfall data
Villages 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Sahelian region
Woure 362 324 441 302 201
0.75 0.68 0.92 0.63 0.42
Silgey 444 314 425 295 234
0.93 0.65 0.89 0.62 0.49
Sudanian region
Kolbila 646 555 573 423 477
0.89 0.76 0.79 0.58 0.66
Ouonon 504 525 401 533 469
0.7 0.73 0.55 0.74 0.65
Northern-Guinean region
Koho 666 770 725 783 877
0.7 0.81 0.76 0.82 0.92
Sayero 865 561 634 676 664
0.9 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.7
Rainfall data are yearly total rainfall in millimeters. The second row in each cell indicates the proportion of the
long-run regional average rainfall received in a given year.
Source: Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998, p.284)
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Table 2: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sahel Soudanian Northern Guinean
Woure Sigley Kolbila Ouonon Koho Sayero
consumption 32.98 27.57 22.82 15.78 17.92 19.42
(17.23) (12.44) (13.31) (6.36) (8.83) (11.61)
cropincome 21.82 18.17 20.10 15.14 21.12 27.40
(15.84) (12.10) (12.97) (7.39) (16.40) (22.99)
income 26.25 21.21 22.72 16.83 25.57 31.54
(17.93) (16.87) (12.80) (8.45) (17.32) (24.30)
Change in consumption -6.23 -4.51 -1.08 2.38 2.85 0.65
(25.67) (18.38) (16.81) (7.54) (13.61) (13.53)
Change in crop income -9.50 -5.84 -9.23 1.95 5.50 2.35
(21.52) (16.25) (16.70) (8.58) (15.54) (27.70)
Change in total income -10.53 -5.29 -8.25 1.94 3.98 3.00
(21.51) (22.04) (16.66) (9.01) (17.22) (28.55)
Transitory shocks -14.98 -15.19 -16.75 -17.71 -18.02 -16.85
(8.50) (9.32) (8.66) (9.70) (6.64) (12.61)
Pubic Aid received 0.47 0.30 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00
(1.09) (0.61) (0.02) (0.14) 0.00 0.00
Gifts from friends&relatives 0.78 0.61 0.22 0.16 0.27 0.05
(1.31) (1.60) (0.68) (0.35) (0.68) (0.17)
Gifts to friends&relatives 0.78 0.49 0.31 0.48 0.92 0.22
(1.32) (1.01) (0.57) (0.98) (1.44) (0.57)
Net transfers 0.49 0.16 -0.19 -0.23 -0.62 -0.20
(2.54) (1.72) (0.62) (0.96) (1.18) (0.63)
Cattle (head count) 0.91 0.60 0.02 0.44 0.55 0.23
(1.58) (0.86) (0.08) (1.18) (1.06) (0.46)
Sheep (head count) 0.59 0.49 1.31 1.05 0.44 0.32
(2.62) (0.84) (1.16) (1.28) (0.61) (0.93)
Goat (head count) 1.80 0.90 1.56 1.99 0.48 0.79
(2.62) (0.84) (1.16) (1.28) (0.61) (0.93)
Livestock 46.21 49.96 10.45 25.07 22.98 8.25
(65.79) (123.23) (7.90) (46.85) (41.72) (16.45)
Grain stock 4.32 1.42 6.05 2.95 2.12 1.88
(8.22) (2.34) (9.11) (4.36) (7.78) (11.84)
Total labor use (hours) 2132.64 2467.12 5222.17 2977.49 7142.18 4109.45
(1464.21) (1353.62) (4231.70) (2095.77) (4995.85) (2563.73)
Familiy labor use (hours) 2061.48 2381.78 4583.92 2849.43 5678.06 3456.62
(1457.16) (1331.09) (3628.25) (2017.27) (3737.53) (2169.65)
household size (adult equivalents) 7.43 7.60 9.75 8.54 12.71 8.21
(4.62) (4.04) (5.45) (5.23) (7.96) (5.37)
household size (head count) 9.78 9.93 13.11 11.64 15.95 11.07
(6.15) (5.52) (7.45) (7.29) (10.75) (7.41)
Standard deviations are in parentheses
All variables expressed in CFA 1’000 per adult equivalent per annum, unless stated otherwise
Net transfers are gifts from friends/relative plus Public aid minus gifts to relatives/friends
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Quintile of Transitory Shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
quintile Calories dCalories Cons dCons Crop income dCrop income Livestock
1
Mean 2158.251 -2544.926 21.315 -20.010 13.758 -27.709 38.365
Median 2001.060 -2387.595 19.853 -18.526 11.717 -24.857 12.177
St dev 938.353 1631.740 10.998 15.610 11.865 16.625 61.016
2
Mean 1894.161 -925.065 19.457 -5.803 10.997 -11.605 18.772
Median 1568.513 -1069.889 15.433 -7.588 9.590 -12.177 9.283
St dev 1232.924 1509.200 14.523 15.450 7.195 5.348 31.493
3
Mean 1681.902 -283.730 15.929 -0.652 18.408 -1.139 16.916
Median 1600.602 -253.985 14.507 -1.432 15.201 -1.154 3.990
St dev 606.982 800.109 6.423 6.998 13.877 3.892 42.564
4
Mean 2225.538 249.782 21.577 5.556 21.742 6.593 19.947
Median 2017.357 408.834 19.750 6.260 19.163 6.903 6.800
St dev 1076.802 1051.121 10.783 9.791 12.327 3.865 40.367
5
Mean 3220.875 1380.993 31.005 16.838 36.895 22.454 26.691
Median 2951.697 1333.917 27.215 14.497 30.198 17.926 8.825
St dev 1550.737 1273.600 14.516 12.160 24.110 17.905 45.839
Total
Mean 2236.145 -404.086 21.915 -0.899 20.360 -2.281 24.229
Median 1995.695 -271.333 18.942 -0.277 16.289 -1.246 7.674
St dev 1237.788 1827.425 12.771 17.346 17.415 20.384 45.770
Levels and livestock are values before the shock.
All variables are expressed in CFA 1’000 per adult equivalent per annum
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Table 4: Determinants of Income
(1) (2) (3)
Crop income crop income-rich Crop income-poor
Rainfall deviation interacted with
Seno soil area 0.001 -0.109 0.059
[0.04] [2.45]* [1.59]
Zinka soil area 0.014 0.031 -0.026
[0.27] [0.48] [0.29]
Bissiga soil area -0.004 -0.129 0.037
[0.10] [2.05]* [0.73]
Raspuiga soil area 0.039 -0.022 0.076
[0.71] [0.32] [0.21]
Ziniare soil area 0.016 -0.091 0.117
[0.34] [1.51] [1.15]
Other soil area 0.041 -0.061 0.072
[2.70]** [2.28]* [3.72]**
Low land area -0.124 -0.111 -0.059
[5.25]** [3.14]** [1.52]
Near low land area -0.050 0.031 -0.096
[2.57]* [0.90] [3.79]**
Midslope area -0.036 0.052 -0.072
[1.76] [1.35] [2.81]**
Near upland area -0.038 0.157 -0.078
[0.65] [1.49] [1.07]
Near home area -0.108 -0.158 -0.065
[3.74]** [2.26]* [1.63]
Distance to home 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.49] [0.75] [0.29]
Constant 8.264 31.166 -15.350
[0.61] [1.79] [0.44]
Observations 464 203 261
Number of hh 126 55 71
R-squared 0.60 0.66 0.70
F test-rainfall interactions 7.91 4.67 6.41
F-test village-year dummies 20.13 7.5 12.47
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regressions also include demographic variables (adult males, adult females, boys, girls, household size, age of house-
hold head and age age of household head squared) but coefficients are not reported
Household and village-year fixed effects are controlled for
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Table 5: Magnitude of income shocks
Villages Shock nature Crop income Total income
Woure
Aggregate 1.787 2.384
Idiosyncratic 0.585 0.579
Silgey
Aggregate 2.179 2.307
Idiosyncratic 0.562 0.569
Kolbila
Aggregate 2.179 2.307
Idiosyncratic 0.520 0.490
Ouonon
Aggregate 1.113 0.736
Idiosyncratic 0.336 0.303
Koho
Aggregate 1.819 1.691
Idiosyncratic 0.506 0.472
Sayero
Aggregate 0.66 0.56
Idiosyncratic 0.42 0.37
Coefficients of variation of each type shocks.
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Table 6: Determinants of Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Permanent income 0.010
[0.126]
Transitory income 0.541 0.644 0.505
[0.131]*** [0.060]*** [2.12]**
Unexplained income 0.487 0.440 0.420
[0.136]*** [0.054]*** [4.13]***
Rich
Permanent income 0.030
[0.158]
Transitory income 0.567 0.530
[0.165]*** [2.05]**
Unexplained income 0.403 0.212
[0.178]** [1.37]
Poor
Permanent income 0.147
[0.239]
Transitory income 0.589 0.795
[0.199]*** [2.55]**
Unexplained income 0.571 0.651
[0.187]*** [4.61]***
wealthy -1.543
[3.378]
Constant 4.199 2.351 70.859 33.586 -1.312
[18.293] [18.833] [30.953]** [0.19] [0.01]
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.42 0.34 0.38
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Income in columns 1 and 2 is net of imputed value of household labor
Regressions also include demographic variables (adult males, adult females, boys, girls, household size, age of house-
hold head and age age of household head squared) but coefficients are not reported
Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Columns 4 and 5 use the sample of directly observed consumption
Household fixed effects are controlled for.
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Table 8: Determinants of changes in Grain and Livestock Holdings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
grain storage livestock sales
Permanent income 0.327 -0.027
[0.152]** [0.004]***
Transitory income 0.275 -0.004
[0.077]*** [0.002]**
Unexplained income 0.043 -0.002
[0.055] [0.002]
Rich
Permanent income 0.353 -0.028
[0.161]** [0.005]***
Transitory income 0.502 -0.003
[0.106]*** [0.003]
Unexplained income -0.067 -0.010
[0.086] [0.003]***
Poor
Permanent income 0.227 -0.013
[0.243] [0.007]*
Transitory income 0.067 -0.001
[0.109] [0.003]
Unexplained income 0.053 0.006
[0.075] [0.002]***
Constant -181.903 -194.011 1.954 1.613
[36.283]*** [36.518]*** [0.489]*** [0.480]***
Observations 340 340 464 464
Number of hh 126 126 126 126
R-squared 0.38 0.41 0.23 0.28
Absolute value of t in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Household fixed effects controlled for
Regressions also include demographic variables (adult males, adult females, boys, girls, household size, age of house-
hold head and age age of household head squared) but coefficients are not reported
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Table 9: Determinants of Saving
(1) (2)
for rich
Permanent income 0.457 0.555
[0.051]*** [0.076]***
Transitory income 0.092 0.099
[0.092] [0.117]
Unexplained income 0.322 0.370
[0.055]*** [0.087]***
Income Variance 0.023 0.021
[0.003]*** [0.004]***
for poor
Permanent income 0.397
[0.102]***
Transitory income 0.115
[0.120]
Unexplained income 0.288
[0.076]***
Income Variance 0.023
[0.005]***
age of hh head 0.460 0.490
[0.305] [0.310]
hh head age sq. -0.006 -0.006
[0.003]* [0.003]*
Rich -6.546
[4.637]
Constant -35.031 -33.467
[7.986]*** [8.232]***
Observations 392 392
R-squared 0.47 0.47
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 11: Restricted Version of Full Insurance Test, No Village-year Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
IVE IVE
cropincome 0.380
[4.16]***
Poor cropincome 0.439
[3.65]***
Rich cropincome 0.304
[2.24]**
Constant 44.266 47.224
[1.41] [1.51]
coefficient(vyrfe)-coefficient(no vyrfe)
Crop income -0.020
0.122
Poor 0.002
0.452
Rich -0.007
0.138
Observations 395.0 395.0
Number of hh 112.0 112.0
R-squared
Absolute value of t in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Household fixed effects controlled for
Regressions also include demographic variables (adult males, adult females, boys, girls, household size, age of house-
hold head and age age of household head squared) but coefficients are not reported
The first stage is regression 1 but without the village-year dummy variables γtv
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Table 12: Determinants of Net Transfers Received
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IVE OLS IVE
cropincome -0.005 -0.010
[0.97] [0.90]
Poor cropincome -0.012 -0.009
[1.79] [0.71]
Rich cropincome 0.003 -0.011
[0.42] [0.59]
Constant 1.366 1.382 0.979 1.650
[0.42] [0.41] [0.30] [0.47]
Observations 399 399 399 399
Number of hh 114 114 114 114
R-squared 0.570 0.580
Absolute value of t in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Village-year fixed effects and household fixed effects Regressions also include demographic variables (adult males, adult
females, boys, girls, household size, age of household head and age age of household head squared) but coefficients
are not reported
The first stage regressions are reported in table 4.
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Table 13: Estimates of Net Changes in Grain and Livestock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
grain storage livestock sales
income 0.413 -0.02
[5.22]*** [5.20]***
Poor income 0.264 -0.015
[0.87] [1.08]
Rich income 0.42 -0.02
[5.36]*** [5.36]***
Constant 16.336 22.701 2.261 2.062
[0.62] [0.77] [3.91]*** [3.03]***
Observations 340 340 464 464
Number of hh 112 112 126 126
Absolute value of t in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Village-year fixed effects and household fixed effects Regressions also include demographic variables (adult males, adult
females, boys, girls, household size, age of household head and age age of household head squared) but coefficients
are not reported
The first stage regressions are reported in table 4.
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Table 14: Determinants of Age of Livestock at Sale
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crop income 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.009
[0.53] [0.24] [0.25] [0.27]
adult males 0.171 0.214 0.124 0.174
[2.47]** [3.02]*** [0.95] [1.26]
adult females -0.067 -0.149 -0.469 -0.634
[1.40] [2.39]** [3.23]*** [3.70]***
age hh head 0.002 0.005
[0.28] [0.76]
girls -0.03 -0.159
[0.69] [1.50]
boys 0.117 0.177
[2.87]*** [1.74]*
Constant -0.505 -0.666 1.215 1.616
[1.58] [2.04]** [0.96] [1.26]
Observations 1331 1331 1331 1331
Absolute value of t in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Columns 1-2: Village-year-animal type-animal sex fixed effects fixed effects
Columns 3-4: Village-year-animal type-animal sex fixed effects and household fixed effects
Income is instrumented as explained in regression 1.
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Figure 1: Long run rainfall
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Figure 2: Village income and consumption growth
